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Introduction
Many things can be done in di¤erent ways. Managers can motivate employees in di¤erent ways. Dentists can resolve tooth root infections in di¤erent ways. Teachers can teach children arithmetic in di¤erent ways. The list is virtually endless. In many areas, it is a blessing that alternative solutions to a problem exist. It enables one to e¤ectively match a solution with the exact problem. In other areas, matching is less of an issue. In those cases a best solution, or best practice, may exist. The challenge then is to recognize the best practice and to ensure its di¤usion.
The identi…cation and di¤usion of best practices raise two main problems. First, information about di¤erent practices is often dispersed. The reason is that users (teachers, doctors, politicians) usually have experience with a limited number of practices. The implication is that the search for the best practice requires communication. Second, users may identify themselves with a particular practice. Identi…cation is likely in situations where a user is held responsible for the selection of the proper practice. A user may then be reluctant to switch to another practice out of fear of being perceived as somebody who initially selected the wrong one. Such reputational concerns may obstruct di¤usion of best practices. In the present paper we address the question how features of the learning process determine the quality of communication about the performance of locally adopted practices and the di¤usion of best practices. We compare a decentralized and a centralized process. In a decentralized process, users communicate with each other about their experiences (horizontal communication). Next, each user makes his own decision regarding the practice to use. In a centralized decision process, users of practices communicate with a central authority (vertical communication) , and the central authority chooses the practice the users have to adopt next.
The following two examples illustrate that the above mentioned problems as to the identi…cation and di¤usion of best practices are real-world problems. First, the delivery of medical interventions varies widely from place to place. 1 This variation has been a source of worries as, most likely, some patients do not receive optimal treatment. 2 It also o¤ers scope 1 That variation is large is a well-established fact, see Phelps (2000) . 2 See, e.g., Eddy (1990) .
for learning. In response, physicians'associations and health care authorities have exerted much e¤ort to design learning processes in which locally gained experiences are compared, and best practices -interventions, surgical procedures, drug use -di¤used. In the medical sector, expert panels are frequently used to evaluate the evidence on the e¤ectiveness of rival practices in a given …eld. Given the close ties between experts and industry, and the long gestation period that characterizes the development of practices, experts tend to have vested interests and to identify with certain practices. The result, according to students of expert panels, is "process loss" due to status concerns and social pressure, meaning poor information exchange and aggregation in the meetings, and a low adoption rate of best practices afterwards. 3 Organizing these panels is therefore fraught with problems. An important organizational dimension is the degree of centralization of the process and, relatedly, the degree of freedom individual physicians have in following the outcomes of panel meetings. 4 The European Union is another case in point. It has been promoting the so-called open method of coordination (OMC) to foster learning and the di¤usion of best practices in many policy areas. The hope is that goals like EU competitiveness can be furthered by avoiding the grand questions about the best model for Europe and by taking instead a more pragmatic micro-orientation in which countries that face similar problems seek to learn from each other. Rather than relying on legislation by Brussels, the OMC leaves more freedom to member states to implement the lessons learned. Moreover, instead of applying formal sanctions to transgressors, the OMC turns to naming and shaming to expose a country's weak performance in public, and applies peer pressure if a country opposes adoption of superior policies. 5 In practice, the method is not considered to be very successful in guaranteeing a high quality learning process. It is generally felt that countries exaggerate the success of their current practices. The implementation of new ideas is very limited. Claudio Radaelli (2003, p. 12) , a political scientist, argues that these disappointing results stem from a misguided view of policy makers among the proponents of the OMC. Rather than caring about the truth, they care about political capital and prestige.
Both the example of the medical sector and the example of the European Union make 3 See Fink et al. (1984) and Rowe et al. (1991) . 4 Eddy (1990) distinguishes, in increasing degree of freedom, standards, guidelines, and options. 5 See Pochet (2005) and Radaelli (2003) .
clear that the identi…cation and di¤usion of best practices require communication, and that learning may be hampered by reputational or career concerns. By de…nition, learning from others requires the ability to go beyond one's local experience. It is therefore related to globalization. In the context of the search for best practices, globalization may have two e¤ects. First, decision makers observe what other decision makers do. Globalization therefore widens the scope for learning as more experiences can be exchanged. Second, the "market"
receives more information about local decision-makers. By the market we mean the people in the eyes of whom a decision-maker wants to come across as competent. For example, the peers of a medical specialist may observe that his practice gains more adherents in other areas. Or, in line with the EU example, a citizen of a country may observe that politicians or administrative bureaucracies adopt policies from another country. Therefore, as a result of globalisation, the market can compare treatments or policies across places. We will argue that this aspect of globalization has important implications for how reputational concerns a¤ect communication and …nal decisions.
The main objective of our analysis is to better understand the e¤ects of (i) the structure of the learning process (decentralization versus centralization) and (ii) the degree of globalization of the market on the quality of information exchange and, in turn, on the quality of decisions. We use an incomplete contracts approach to understand the way in which communication about the quality of locally adopted technologies is a¤ected by the assignment of decision rights. In that sense, we follow Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) . In particular, we do not endow some mechanism designer with the ability to …rst design complete contracts that prompt agents to reveal their information and next to commit to them.
Clearly, a mechanism design approach would demonstrate the superiority of centralization, and would not contribute to our understanding of the e¤ects of globalization on the decision whether or not to centralize. 6 We present a simple two-period model of learning in which agents care both about adopt-6 See Mookherjee (2006) for an excellent survey on the centralization-decentralization debate from a mechanism design perspective. It is perhaps worth noting that in the context of a search for best practices a central authority does not always exist. A temporary one (e.g., a health care consensus panel) must be created. It might be hard for such a temporary central authority to commit to mechanisms.
ing the better practice and about acquiring a reputation for …nding the better practice (medical intervention, policy etc.). Through learning-by-doing each agent gains information about the value of his own practice. We assume this information to be private and non-veri…able.
The information exchanged then amounts to cheap talk. In the conclusion, we brie ‡y discuss how our main results would be a¤ected if information were veri…able.
We now turn to a discussion of our results. In period one, an agent adopts a practice he considers to be the better one. In case of a decentralized learning process, the period two decision is characterized by inertia. This arises as, in equilibrium, continuation of one's initial technology commands a higher reputation than change as it signals higher observed values of the practice and therefore a better initial choice. Hence, given the information an agent has, he sticks to his initial choice even though it would have been …rst-best to switch.
The information he has is partly gained through learning-by-doing, partly by what others are willing to share with him. The quality of information exchange in the decision-making process is high if markets are unaware of practices used by other agents ('local markets'). An agent can only gain by listening to others, and has nothing to loose by truthfully revealing his own experience, as his reputation does not depend on the practice that the other agent adopts in period two.
When markets gain a better understanding of the technologies that are initially adopted in other places thanks to progressing globalization ('global markets') an agent's reputation starts to depend on what technologies he and others use. His reputation is particularly strong if others start to adopt "his"initial technology. As a result, the role of communication in the decision-making process becomes strategic. Global markets create competition. An agent wants to convince others that "his"technology is best. We show that communication breaks down completely: an agent only learns which technology has been used in other places. This is reminiscent of the experience of the OMC, a case of decentralized learning with global markets. We present conditions under which the globalization of markets in case learning is decentralized hurts welfare.
Decision-making in a centralized learning process does not su¤er from inertia as the center only cares about the technology's value. But the center depends on the agents to provide him with information. An agent now faces a trade-o¤. On the one hand, as the agent has no decision-making power, he wants to make sure that the center is well-informed. On the other hand, his reputational concerns imply that he wants the center to impose "his" technology at either site. In equilibrium, each agent sends coarse information about his own practice. We derive conditions under which the globalization of markets in case learning is centralized improves welfare. We also derive the conditions under which, in the case of local markets, the quality of information exchange is so poor under centralized learning (vis-à-vis decentralized learning) that it o¤sets the improved decision-making conditional on information. Furthermore, we establish that in the case of global markets a centralized learning process uniformly outperforms a decentralized learning process. One reason is that with global markets communication between the agents and the center does not vanish, however much the agents care about their reputations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related literature. In Section 3, we present the model. Section 4 analyses isolated agents, a benchmark situation in which agents can learn from their own past experience only. In section 5 we analyse decentralized learning, with local and global markets. In section 6 we perform the same analysis for centralized learning. Section 7 contains the comparisons. Section 8 concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the literature that studies how the quality of information exchange is determined by the features of the decision-making process. This literature takes an incomplete contracts approach to decision-making in which commitment is limited to the ex ante assignment of decision rights. As a result, communication among agents amounts to cheap talk. In their seminal paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that the quality of cheap talk depends on the degree of alignment between the interests of the informed sender and the uninformed decision-maker (receiver). In Crawford and Sobel, and in the literature on cheap talk in general, this degree of alignment is exogenously given. In our model, by contrast, this degree is determined in equilibrium. The reason is that senders are concerned with their reputations. These reputations are determined in equilibrium. There is now a growing literature that explores how characteristics of decision-making processes in ‡uence the quality of communication, both in political science 7 , and in economics 8 . The current paper di¤ers from the existing literature in its focus on the possibilities for learning-by-doing and learning from the experience of others in a context where agents have reputational concerns.
The desirability of decentralization or centralization is also studied by Alonso et al. (2008) and by Rantakari (2008) in the context of a multidivisional …rm. Each division bene…ts from adapting its decision to its own market circumstances and from coordinating its decision with those of the other divisions. Divisions are privately informed about their market circumstances. They can either exchange information and next decide independently
of each other what decisions to take or they can report information to headquarters which then decides for both divisions. They show that even if coordination becomes of overriding concern to the …rm, decentralization may still outperform centralization due to the di¤erence in quality of communication.
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As Alonso et al. and Rantakari we study the e¤ect of the assignment of decision rights on the quality of communication and of the …nal decisions taken. The situation we analyse, however, is quite di¤erent. In our paper, there are no local circumstances to which a decision should ideally be adapted, nor is there a need to coordinate per se. Instead, there is room for learning from each other's past experience (to identify the better technology), resistance to change (because of reputational concerns), and possibly the desire to convince the other to adopt one's technology (due to reputational concerns in case of global markets).
There is a growing literature on reputational concerns. Holmstrom (1999) studies the incentives such concerns give to exert productive e¤ort if there is uncertainty about an agent's ability level. If there is uncertainty about an agent's ability to 'read'or predict the state of the world one speaks of 'expert'models. Experts use the recommendations that they
give, the implementation decision that they take, or the e¤ort they exert to convince the market of their expertise. 10 Part of this expert literature looks at the e¤ects of information 7 See e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) , Austen-Smith (1990) , Coughlan (2000) , and Austen- Smith and Feddersen (2005) . 8 See e.g. Dessein (2002 Dessein ( , 2007 , Visser and Swank (2007) , Alonso et al. (2008) , Rantakari (2008) , and Friebel and Raith (2010) . 9 Friebel and Raith (2010) study how the scope of the …rm a¤ects the quality of strategic information transmission between a division and head quarters. 10 Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Sorensen (2001, 2006) deal with the advice given by disclosure ('transparency') about an expert's actions and about the outcomes of decisions.
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Clearly, the present paper is related to that literature. Globalization of markets, for example, amounts to increased disclosure of information that is useful in evaluating an agent's ability.
We show that it destroys communication in case of decentralized learning, but improves it in case of centralized learning. That is, the same form of transparency may give rise to very di¤erent e¤ects depending on the institutions in which it is introduced.
Our paper is also related to the literature on laboratory federalism and policy di¤usion in political science, see Oates (1999) . In an interesting recent paper, Volden, Ting, and
Carpenter (2008) (2001) and Suurmond et al. (2004) , deal with the projects an expert implements and the e¤ort he exerts to become informed. 11 See Suurmond et al. (2004) and Prat (2005) in a single-agent setting, and Levy (2007) and Swank and Visser (2009) in a committee setting. 12 See the discussion of social learning in a strategic experimentation game in Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) . In this literature, it is assumed that an agent perfectly observes both the technology others use and the true value they obtain. It is not clear that an agent, if he could, would not want to deviate from a strategy of truthfully revealing the value of the technology he has gained experience with. It seems that he would bene…t from exaggerating the value as this would make adoption by others more likely. As a result, more (public) information would become available about this technology, and the deviator would bene…t from an improved estimate of the technology's value. 13 See Bala and Goyal (1998) for a model of learning in non-strategic networks, and Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) and Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) The fact that in our model the quality of information exchange and the degree of inertia are endogenous, and that a key assumption of the statistical bandit model is violated imply that a general analysis of the asymptotic behaviour of the decision-making processes described here is di¢ cult and beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we compare the behaviour of agents across various decision-making processes in a two-period setting.
3 A model of learning-by-doing and learning from others with reputational concerns.
There are two sites (hospitals, states, etc.), i 2 f1; 2g, and one problem. There is an agent i at each site. Often, j will denote "the other site"or "the other agent,"j 6 = i. The problem has to be addressed at each site both in period t = 1 and in t = 2. There are two possible technologies (policies, interventions, etc.) X 2 fY; Zg, one of which has to be used to 14 In the literature on informational herding, communication between decision-makers is excluded although the environment in non-strategic. See e.g. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998 address the problem at each site in each period. The technology adopted at site i in period t is denoted by X i;t . A priori, the value of technology X is unknown, but independent of time and site. Moreover, we assume that it is a random draw from a continuous and strictly increasing distribution function F X ( ) and associated density function f X ( ), with support
. Note that we use X both to denote a technology and its random value. We assume that the values Y and Z are iid, F Y = F Z = F . We use lower case letters, like x, to denote a possible value of technology X, such that x 2 [0; 1]. As strategies will be de…ned in terms of X (or x), it will be useful to let X C (or x C ) refer to "the other technology". That is, if
The agents'diagnostic ability levels i 2 ; and the state of the world (y; z) 2 [0; 1] 2 are exogenously given. The ability levels and the state of the world are all statistically independent, with = Pr i = 2 (0; 1) for i 2 f1; 2g.
At the beginning of period t = 1, agent i at site i receives a private, non-veri…able, sig-
about which technology solves the problem best. The informativeness of the signal depends on the agent's ability:
, for X 2 fY; Zg. That is, if i is highly able, i = , the signal (diagnosis) reveals with probability one the better technology:
Pr x > x C js X ; = 1 for X 2 fY; Zg. Hence, conditional on s X and = , X is distributed as the maximum of two iid random variables, F X xjs X ; = F (x) 2 . On the other hand, if i is less able, i = , the signal is uninformative about the relative quality of the technology: F X xjs X ; = F (x). Note that an agent does not get a signal about his ability.
Instead, is the common prior. 16 Still in period 1, i next decides which technology X to adopt on the basis of his signal s i . At the end of the period he learns the value x of the chosen technology (learning-by-doing).
At this point, it is worth emphasizing that the focus of our analysis will be on period 2.
As mentioned in the introduction, we intend to understand the pros and cons of alternative learning processes in situations where (i) agents have gained experiences with di¤erent technologies, treatments, or policies and (ii) there is scope for learning. In our model, period 16 What matters for the results is that if i = , member i has a higher likelihood of correctly assessing the state of the economy than if i = .
1 can be interpreted as the history in which agents gained information. We model history to stress that past decisions matter for current decisions, for example, through reputational concerns.
We distinguish three learning processes p that characterize period t = 2. Such a process consists of a decision-making stage, possibly preceded by a communication stage. In case there is a communication stage, agent i sends a message about the quality of the technology adopted at site i in period t = 1. The receiver of this message depends on the process p. We assume that agent i, if and when he sends a message, knows the technology (not its value) that j has used in t = 1 when he sends a message. This is often the relevant case, as agents may well be aware that other technologies are used, without knowing their quality. Hence, a communication strategy
is a message space, in case his signal equals s i , the observed value of X i;1 equals x i;1 , and agent j uses technology X j;1 . Next, a decision maker determines which technology X i;2 is adopted at site i at time t = 2. Who this decision maker is depends on the decision process p. Let (ii) In case of decentralized learning (p=dl), each agent i simultaneously sends a message m i to the other agent concerning the value of the technology he has adopted in t = 1. So,
That is, in addition to the information in case of p=ia, and the message he sends to j, i also knows the technology X j;1 2 fY; Zg adopted at the other site, and the message m j 2 M about the value of that technology. Agent i next decides on X i;2 . Let d dl i (s i ; x i;1 ; m i ; X j;1 ; m j ) 2 fY; Zg denote the technology that i adopts in t = 2 given I dl i .
(iii) In case of centralized learning (p=cl), each agent i simultaneously sends a message m i concerning the value of the technology he has adopted in t = 1 to "the center."Hence,
2 represents the center's information set: information about which technology has been adopted at each site, and a message concerning the value of each technology. Next, the center decides which technology is adopted at either site. Let d cl C (X 1;1 ; X 2;1 ; m 1 ; m 2 ) 2 fY; Zg fY; Zg denote the correspondence indicating for given technologies used at either site and for given messages sent by the agents the technology that is used at sites 1 and 2, respectively in t = 2. As no confusion can arise, we write I C instead of I cl C , and
As noted in the introduction, globalization has two e¤ects: …rst, it allows a previously isolated agent to learn from the experience of others, and second, it o¤ers more information about a local agent to "the market". The market at site i at time t is characterized by its information, i;t . An agent learns about technologies and their values through learning-bydoing and by listening to others. We assume that the market knows less about technologies than an agent does: markets only know certain patterns of technology adoption. In particular, in t = 1, i;1 = fX i;1 g for i 2 f1; 2g. For t = 2, we distinguish two cases. Say that markets are local, if markets possess knowledge about site-speci…c adoption patterns only, i;2 = fX i;1 ; X i;2 g for i 2 f1; 2g. Say that markets are global, if markets possess knowledge about all adoption patterns, i;2 = fX i;1 ; X j;1 ; X i;2 ; X j;2 g for i 2 f1; 2g. We call (X i;1 ; X j;1 ; X i;2 ; X j;2 ) the adoption vector, indicating which technologies are adopted in t = 1 at sites i and j, and in t = 2 at sites i and j, respectively. Clearly then, we assume that learning-by-doing gives the agent an informational advantage over his market: whereas an agent learns the true value of the technology he uses, his market only observes certain adoption patterns.
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To analyse the e¤ect of reputational concerns, we assume that an agent's utility depends on the value of the technology adopted at his site and on his market's assessment of his ability. The ex post belief that i is highly able conditional on the information set i;t equals^ i;t ( i;t ) = Pr i = j i;t . If x is the value of the technology X i;t that i adopts, and the market's information set equals i;t , then the period t utility of agent i equals U (X i;t ) = x + ^ i;t ( i;t ), with > 0 the relative weight of reputational concerns. We ignore time discounting. The center's utility equals the sum of the values of the technologies adopted in t = 2, U C (X 1;2 ; X 2;2 ) = x 1;2 + x 2;2 .
Di¤erent decision processes cause di¤erences in behaviour in the second period, but not in the …rst. This will be readily apparent from the analysis in the following sections.
Independent of the decision process, period t = 1 behaviour that maximizes agent i's utility is to follow his signal:
This maximizes the expected value of the technology and minimizes the probability of changing (or having to change) technology in period 2.
An equilibrium consists of a communication strategy i ( ) for each agent, a belief function f i ( jI) for each decision maker, a decision strategy d i ( ) for each decision maker, and ex post assessments^ i;t ( ) for each market. We use the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (from now on, equilibrium) to characterize behaviour. This requires (i) that the communication strategies are optimal for each type given decision makers' strategies and market assessments; (ii) that the decision strategy is optimal given the belief functions and market assessments; (iii) that beliefs and market assessments are obtained using Bayes rule.
Because of the inherent symmetry, we write the analysis from the point of view of agent i = 1 and assume that s 1 = s Y . Of course, s 2 2 s Y ; s Z . We ignore babbling equilibria if an equilibrium in which information is transmitted exists.
Isolated agents
Once agent 1 has followed his signal s Y in period 1 and observed value y, he has to decide whether to continue with his technology. Note that having received s Y and next observing y allows an agent to update the expected value of the other technology,
E Zjs
where we have used that E Zjs
. Two e¤ects of y can be distinguished. First, the larger is y, the more likely it is that the agent is highly able and correctly identi…ed the more valuable technology. This is the Pr js Y ; y term. Second, conditional on the agent being highly able, a higher value of y increases the expected value of Z. This is the 
Ignore reputational concerns for the moment. Given I ia 1 = s Y ; y , the decision strategy that maximizes the expected value of the technology adopted at site 1 in the second period, the …rst-best strategy, is to stick to the existing technology if and only if y E Zjs Y ; y .
It follows from lemma 1, part (b), and it is clear from Figure 1 , panel a, that the …rst-best decision strategy is a single-threshold strategy, 
Irrespective of t, continuation commands a higher reputation than switching to the other technology. Continuation suggests having observed a su¢ ciently high value of y. A highly able agent is more likely to have implemented a technology that generates a high value than a less able agent. Hence, as an agent cares about his reputation, he wants to deviate from the …rst-best decision rule by lowering the hurdle that his initial technology should pass for its continuation. The agent wants to give up technological adequacy for reputational bene…ts.
We will call the di¤erence^ 1 (Y; Y ; t) ^ 1 (Y; Z; t) the reputational gap. It is the source of the distortion. Proposition 1 describes equilibrium behaviour of an isolated agent.
Proposition 1 In case of isolated agents, and for < ia = E [Z] = , there exists an equilibrium in whicth the decision strategy is a single-threshold strategy with threshold value y ia that satis…es
with y ia 2 0; y
. y ia is a decreasing function of . 19 For ia , y ia = 0, i.e., agent 1 always continues his initial technology, and^ 1 (Y; Y ; 0) = and^ 1 (Y; Z; 0) = 0. Figure 1 , panel b. At the threshold value y ia the agent is indifferent between sticking to Y and switching to Z. This can also be seen by rewriting (3) as y ia + ^ 1 (Y; Y ; y ia ) = E Zjs Y ; y ia + ^ 1 (Y; Z; y ia ). The left-hand side equals the value 18 Deriviations can be found in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix. 19 We cannot exclude the possibility of multiple equilibria in general. In case of multiple equilibria, we show that the highest and the lowest equilibrium values of y ia are decreasing functions of . We have established numerically that in case of the uniform distribution, the equilibrium is unique, in this and all other sections.
Eq (3) is illustrated in
of continuing with Y if its observed value equals y ia , whereas the left-hand side equals the value of switching technology for the same observed value of Y . It follows from (2) that the lower y ia is, the lower is the reputation the agent commands in case of sticking to the original technology and in case of switching technologies. If the hurdle for continuation is lowered, passing the hurdle becomes a less convincing signal of diagnostic ability. At the same time, not passing a lower hurdle becomes a stronger signal of incompetence. It can be checked that the reputational gap increases the lower is y ia . As the reputational gap is still strictly positive for a threshold value equal to zero, it follows from (3) that for ia y ia = 0: the agent will continue with his initial choice of technology irrespective of its value. 
Decentralized learning process
We begin by describing …rst-best behaviour in a decentralized process. In the communication stage each agent truthfully reveals his private information. Say that 1 truthfully reveals his private information if, for all y 2 [0; 1], and all X 2;1 2 fY; Zg, Pr m 1 js Y ; y; X 2;1 = 1 if m 1 = y and Pr m 1 js Y ; y; X 2;1 = 0 otherwise. Next, the …rst-best decision strategy equals 
That is, agent 1 continues with his original technology Y (i) if both agents used the same technology and its value exceeds t S ; or (ii) if the agents used di¤erent technologies, but the other technology is either less valuable or its superior performance does not exceed by a margin larger than t D the value of the current technology. Let^ 1 (Y; X; t S ; t D ) denote 1's reputation if he uses d dl 1 ( ), and adopts X 1;2 = X in period 2, with X 2 fY; Zg. To see that an agent wants to distort the decision on X 1;2 , suppose 1 were to use the …rst-best threshold values, ( t S ; t D ) = y F B dl ; 0 . If 1 continues with his initial technology, his market would deduce that either the same technology was used at the other site and its observed value exceeded y F B dl , or that the other site used the other technology which proved to be of inferior quality. Either event strengthens 1's reputation. Analogously, discontinuing a technology hurts a reputation. As a result, reputational concerns induce an agent to distort the decision in t = 2. If both agents adopted Y in t = 1, then agent 1 sticks to this technology if and only if
Similarly, in case agents adopted di¤erent technologies, agent 1 wants to continue with Y i¤
. Proposition 2 describes equilibrium behaviour.
) and lo dl = 1= . In case of decentralized learning with local markets, an equilibrium exists in which (i) it is a weakly dominant communication strategy to truthfully reveal private information;
(ii) the belief functions are Pr (x 2;1 jm 2 ) = 1 for x 2;1 = m 2 and Pr (x 2;1 jm 2 ) = 0 for x 2;1 6 = m 2 ; (iii) the decision strategy is a double-threshold strategy. For < lo dl , threshold values ( t S ; t D ) satisfy
with t S 2 0; y 
Global markets
We start by showing that …rst-best behaviour, described on page 15, is not equilibrium and (Y; Z; Z; Z). The inference the market draws from the …rst (resp. second) vector is that Y (resp. Z) is the superior technology, and that 1 made the correct (resp. wrong) choice. The correct choice can be thanks to skill, or due to low ability and luck. The wrong choice, by contrast, must be due to low ability. Hence 21 ,^ 1 (Y; Z; Y; Y ) =
1+
> and 1 (Y; Z; Z; Z) = 0. Clearly, from a reputational point of view, the former is the best and the latter is the worst that could happen to agent 1. Could 1 convince 2 to adopt "his" given any adoption vector, any increase in the use at t = 2 of the technology 1 adopted in t = 1 does not decreases the reputation of 1.
Assumption 1 Consider any adoption vector with X 1;1 = Y . The reputation of 1 does not decrease if 1 (resp. 2) changes from X 1;2 = Z to X 1;2 = Y (resp. from X 2;2 = Z to
With this assumption, the deviation is advantageous in terms of reputation, and costless in terms of technical adequacy. We have proved the next Lemma.
Lemma 2 First-best behaviour is not equilibrium behaviour in case of decentralized learning with global markets.
The above line of reasoning can be applied to any imputed equilibrium in which, in case agents started by adopting di¤erent technologies, 2's decision regarding X 2;2 depends on the message m 1 of 1. The pro…table deviation is then for 1 to send the message that induces 2 to adopt Y , and to continue to base his own decision for t = 2 on a comparison of y and the expected value of Z given m 2 . This shows that the unique equilibrium communication strategy in case X 2;1 = Z is a pooling strategy. 22 The interest an agent has to convince the other to agent to switch technology destroys all meaningful communication. This is in line with one of the concerns expressed about the OMC in the EU, a case of a decentralized learning process with global markets.
In case agents initially adopted the same technology, Y , it is easy to see that truthful revelation is an equilibrium strategy. Communication is also irrelevant. 23 Proposition 3
22 To avoid a discussion of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, we assume that each agent uses a probability distribution over the full support [0; 1] that is independent of the value y he observed. We refer to this equilibrium communication strategy simply by "pooling strategy". 23 This is so as in our model technologies have a common value that is learned before agents communicate in t = 2.
below establishes that in this case an agent wants to deviate from …rst-best behaviour in the decision stage.
As communication breaks down in case of di¤erent initial technologies, and is irrelevant in case of the same initial technology, the equilibrium decision strategy of 1 amounts to a comparison of y with a cut-o¤ value that depends on the number of agents that used the same technology in t = (ii) the belief function equals (a) the density f 1 zjI dl 1 = f (z) for all z and m 2 in case X 2;1 = Z; and (b) discrete probabilities in case X 2;1 = Y , Pr (yjm 2 ) = 1 for y = m 2 and Pr (yjm 2 ) = 0 for y 6 = m 2 ;
(iii) the decision strategy is a double-cut-o¤ strategy. The cut-o¤ value in case initial technologies are the same, c S , satis…es
with c S 2 0; y ȳ y Global markets know the technologies adopted at either site. Local markets do not have such knowledge. As a result, there is a single reputational gap in case of local markets, see the left-hand sides of (4) and (5) 
Centralized learning Process
First-best behaviour in the case of a centralized learning process is for each agent to truthfully reveal his private information, and for the center next to pick the technology with the higher, reported or expected, value: We start by showing that …rst-best behaviour is not equilibrium behaviour in case of centralized learning.
Lemma 3 Under centralized learning, an equilibrium in which agents truthfully reveal their private information does not exist, neither in case of local nor in case of global markets.
It su¢ ces to show that agent 1 has an incentive to slightly exaggerate the value of Y in case j adopted a di¤erent solution. If agents and planner were to stick to …rst-best behaviour, then an agent commands a higher reputation if he is allowed to continue with "his"solution ; m 2 ) = Z with probability smaller than one. That is, the agent uses at least two ranks, N 2. To save space, we write a instead of a (N ) if this does not lead to confusion. Does an agent truthfully report the value of his technology to the center if the other agent uses the same technology in t = 1? Agent i's interest are di¤erent from those of the center, but identical to those of the agent j. This o¤ers room for the agents to (tacitly) collude, and to induce the center to choose the technology they deem best. Each can send either of two messages, one such that the center will next decide that the technology is su¢ ciently good to merit continuation, and one inducing the center to force the agents to switch. Note that collusive behaviour of this sort seems easy to sustain as there is no asymmetric information among the agents. 28 Although this is a partition strategy with N 2, to distinguish it from the more general partition strategy in case agents use di¤erent technologies, we refer to it 27 Note that between any two partitions the expert uses a random strategy. This guarantees that in equilibrium any possible message is sent with strictly positive probability. A discussion of out-of-equilibrium beliefs (what should the planner think about the value of a technology if he were to observe a non-equilibrium message?) can thus be avoided. 28 In a previous version of this paper we show that truthfully revealing information to the center in case agents use the same technology can be part of equilibrium. However, it amounts to playing a weakly dominated strategy, an unlikely candidate to describe agents'behaviour.
as a collusion strategy. It is completely characterized by a single value, y S 2 [0; 1], for which an agent is indi¤erent between sending one message rather than the other.
Let the center choose the technology that is the better one given the messages of the agents. In case they rank di¤erent technologies the same, the center is indi¤erent and tosses a coin. Even if both agents report on the same technology, the center may still decide to make them switch to the other technology. Formally, 
and g (x) = 0 everywhere else. The next proposition characterizes equilibrium behaviour.
Proposition 4 De…ne
. In case of centralized learning, there exists an equilibrium in which (i) the center's decision strategy is as de…ned in (8).
(ii) the communication strategy is (a) a partition strategy (N ; a ) if initial technologies di¤er, and (b) a collusion strategy y S if initial technologies are the same;
(ii) the center's belief function is (a) f 1 (x i;1 jI C ) = T r x i;1 ; a r ; a r+1 for m X 1 2 a r ; a r+1 for r = 0; : : : ; N 1 if initial technologies di¤er, and (b) f 1 (yjI C ) = T r (y; 0; y S ) for m In case agents used di¤erent technologies, the communication strategy is a partition strategy. Eqs (9) and (11) determine the partitioning in case of local and global markets, respectively. If agent 1 observes a value y he has to decide how to rank his technology. The higher the rank is, the more likely it becomes that the center chooses his technology. This suggests that his technology is the better one. As a result, agent 1 enjoys a reputational bene…t. Ranking it highly also has a cost. If z > y but agent 2 does not rank Z as highly as 1 ranks Y , the center forces both agents to choose Y , the inferior technology in period 2.
This possibility stops the agent from ranking his technology too highly. The left-hand sides of the equations state the net reputational value of continuing with one's technology. For y = a r , this gain is exactly o¤set by a loss in expected project value due to continuation: the agent is indi¤erent between using two adjacent ranks (messages) to describe the value of technology Y . Sending one message rather than the other changes the choice of the center only for z 2 a r 1 ; a r+1 , see the right-hand side of (9) This endogeneity may make that agents send relevant information about the state for any …nite . Indeed, proposition 4, part iv states that agents send relevant information about the technology's values for any …nite in case they started out with di¤erent technologies and markets are global.
This di¤erence is illustrated in Figure 4 . Panel a shows the determination of the equilibrium value a 1 in the uniform-quadratic case of Crawford and Sobel. For N = 2, the value of 2b, see e.g. Gibbons (1992, p. 216) . This equality can also be written as
The LHS captures the di¤erence in preference alignment. It determines the equilibrium value a 1 . The LHS (RHS) of (13) 
The dotted lines represent the LHS for various values of . The reputational gap, the source of the di¤erence in preference alignment, depends on the equilibrium value a 1 and equals zero for a 1 = 0. The drawn line graphs the RHS. The graphs illustrates that for any …nite , there is a unique a 1 > 0. That is, for any …nite weight that the agent puts on his reputation, the agent uses (at least) two ranks.
The key to understand why communication among agents and centre remains possible for any …nite in case of global markets is the fact that the reputational gap equals zero 30 See the proof of Proposition 4.
for a 1 = 0. If agents use di¤erent technologies and a 1 = 0, the center decides on the technology that is to be used in t = 2 by tossing a coin. As global markets know that the initial distribution of technologies equaled Y; Z, the decision of the center does not add any information on the relative values of the technologies nor on the ability of the agents. . 31 The reason is that a local market does not know whether agents initially used the same technologies or di¤erent ones. If an agent is forced to change technology, the market deduces that agents must initially have used di¤erent technologies and that next the center tossed a coin. The deduced di¤erence in initial technology hurts an agent's reputation. If instead an agent must continue his initial technology this may also mean that both agents initially used the same technology. The latter makes it more likely that the agents received a correct signal. As a result, continuation boosts an agent's reputation, and the reputational gap continues to exist even for a 1 = 0.
Welfare Comparisons
How does globalization a¤ect the quality of learning? An isolated agent can only learn from his own past experience with a given technology. Globalization allows him to compare his experience with that of others. Furthermore, globalization may make that local markets become global. To understand the welfare consequences of these two forms of globalization, we consider for each process the expected value of the technology that is in use at site 1 in period 2, assuming that 1 starts with Y , E X i;2 js Y ; ; . The expectation is taken over y, and before 1 knows agent 2's technology in period 1, assuming of course equilibrium behaviour. The theoretical maximum value is E [Y jy > z], which obtains if agent 1 chooses the better technology in period 2 with probability one. No process generates this value, unless = 1 in which case the better technology is identi…ed in t = 1. Absent perverse behaviour,
. This is the expected value in 31 For the derivation, see the proof of Proposition 4.
case the technology adopted at site 1 in t = 2 equals the …rst period choice with probability one, independent of the experience gained with the technologies in t = 1 throughout the economy.
To focus on di¤erences in value creation thanks to learning from own past behaviour and from the experience of others, we transform E X i;2 js Y ; ; using the following formula,
That is, W ( ; ) 2 [0%; 100%] captures value creation thanks to learning, over and above the minimum value, as a percentage of what is maximally attainable. We refer to it as 'welfare.'
Decentralized learning: welfare comparisons
In this subsection, we compare isolated agents with decentralized learning, and decentralized learning cum local markets with decentralized learning cum global markets. A shift from local markets to global markets could be the result of the IT revolution and increased information dissemination over the WWW, or of societal pressures to increase transparency that allow for comparisons across sites.
Key to welfare comparisons are (i) the information agents have, and (ii) the degree to which they use it in the various situations. Consider (i). By de…nition, an isolated agent only knows the value of his own technology, and does not know what technology has been adopted at the other site. We know from Propositions 2 and 3 that in case of a decentralized learning process for any > 0 agent 1 in a global market also knows X 2;1 (but not x 2;1 if X 2;1 = Z), and that with local markets he knows both X 2;1 and x 2;1 . If an agent does not care about his reputation, additional information can only lead to an increase in welfare.
This implies that there is some 1 > 0 such that for all 2 (0; 1 ) additional information is also welfare-enhancing: To understand the condition E [Z] (1 + ) < 1, it is important to realize that information has two roles. On the one hand, additional information helps the agent in identifying the better technology. In case of local markets, agent 1 knows the value of the other technology.
The di¤erence z y can be as large as 1. In case of global markets, agent 1 can only calculate
Hence, ceteris paribus, should be larger in case of local markets than in case of global markets for any information about Z to be ignored and for the agent to continue with Y . On the other hand, additional information helps the market in evaluating an agent's ability. A global market knows that agents initially adopted di¤erent technologies, whereas a local market does not. As a result, reputation-wise more is at stake in a local market than in a global market. If agent 1 were to continue with Y , rather than to switch to Z, independent of what he knows about Z, then the reputational gap equals with local markets and = (1 + ) < with global markets. Hence, ceteris paribus, should be larger in case of global markets than in case of local markets for information about Z to be ignored and for the agent to continue with Y . The inequality E [Z] (1 + ) < 1 holds if it is su¢ ciently hard to identify the better technology, and if the unconditional expected value of a technology is su¢ ciently low. In case of the uniform distribution or any other symmetric distribution it holds as < 1.
In Figure 5 , we compare project value, measured by W , for decentralized learning with local and global markets and for isolated agents under the assumption that the value of technology X 2 fY; Zg is uniformly distributed, f X (x) = 1 on [0; 1], and that = who is of high ability with probability = 1=2 and learns from his own experience only can capture 60% of the increase in expected project value. Learning from others further increases this percentage. Second, globalization, i.e., global rather than local markets, reduces the positive e¤ect of learning from others. The main reason is that communication breaks down when markets become global. Third, the relative performance does not change in .
Additional calculations (not reported here) show that this is true independent of the value of . The following Proposition sums up.
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Proposition 5 For any f X and , there exists a 1 > 0 such that W ia ( ; ) < W gl dl ( ; ) < W lo dl ( ; ) for all < 1 . Furthermore, for any f X and such that E [Z] (1 + ) < 1, there exists a 2 > 0 such that . Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 6 for the uniform distribution and = 1=2. We have imposed that communication with the center is limited to at most two ranks in case agents initially used di¤erent technologies. Clearly, if agents can learn from others welfare improves.
Because of our limitation to at most two ranks, the graph understates the bene…ts for low values of . In fact, for = 0, agents would truthfully reveal their private information and the performance of a centralized learning process would equal that of a decentralized learning process. We then know from Figure 5 7.3 What learning process is best for given markets?
The welfare comparisons in the previous two subsections show how a given learning process fares under di¤erent degrees of market globalization. In this subsection we turn to the complementary question, and analyse, for a given degree of globalization of markets, the conditions that determine whether decentralization or centralization performs best.
If markets are local, the learning process that is best depends fundamentally on the parameters of the model.
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Proposition 7 In case of local markets, there exists a 6 < lo cl such that welfare W ( ; ) is higher with decentralized learning than with centralized learning for all > 6 if and only if What learning process is best if markets are global?
Proposition 9 In case of global markets, and for any f X , , and , welfare W ( ; ) is higher with centralized learning than with decentralized learning.
The main bene…t of moving from decentralization to centralization in case of global markets is the restoration of communication when agents initially used di¤erent technologies.
The proof establishes that even if agents in a centralized learning process were to limit themselves to a communication strategy consisting of at most two ranks -and choose a 1 optimally -welfare goes up. This suggests that the welfare di¤erence can be substantial for low values of , as such values allow for richer communication (i.e., …ner partitions).
Concluding Remarks
An important objective of this paper was to gain insight into the e¤ects of alternative learning processes on the quality of decisions in situations where information is dispersed among agents, and agents are concerned about their reputations. Our analysis focuses on two broad features of decision-making processes: the extent of centralization and whether decision-makers operate in a local or global world. We believe that our focus enabled us to derive a couple of interesting results. By focusing on these two broad features, we have abstracted from other features of decision-making processes. Here we would like to elaborate on some of the speci…c assumptions we have made.
Centralization. One important assumption is that in a centralized process the center always acts in the general interest. In reality, there is little reason to put so much con…dence in central bodies. For example, a center may be biased towards one of the technologies because of favoritism. Alternatively, a center may be biased because somehow its name is connected to one of the technologies. Of course, our assumption of a "benevolent" center provides too favourable a picture of centralized processes. to convince the other agent to switch to "your" technology. As a result, any negative information will be withheld. The introduction of centralised decision-making in the presence of global markets gives rise to the selective revelation of negative information. On the one hand, as the agent at a site loses decision-making power, he wants to make sure that the center is well-informed. On the other hand, his reputational concerns imply that he wants the center to impose "his" technology at either site. Ceteris paribus, the more damaging negative information is for the technological value, the more likely it is that the information is revealed. Similarly, the more damaging negative information is for his reputation, the less likely it becomes that this information is revealed.
In our model, signals are for free. However, one can easily imagine situations where agents can increase the probability of receiving an informative signal by putting more e¤ort in investigating technologies. We consider modeling agents'e¤ort decisions as a promising extension of our model. We expect that reputational concerns do not only lead to distortions in communication and decisions, but that they may also induce agents to put more e¤ort in investigating technologies, see e.g. Suurmond et al. (2004) .
Decision rights. We have limited attention to centralization and decentralization. A possible third organizational structure is a committee consisting of the two agents that makes a collective decision in period 2 on the basis of some voting rule. Visser and Swank (2007) analyze communication and voting in committees in the presence of reputational concerns.
Our approach is particularly relevant for situations where agents independently gained experiences that are worth sharing. In our model, period 1 represents history. However, in other situations experience still has to be gained. 
Appendix
We use the abbreviations ia, dl, cl, gl, and lo to refer to speci…c learning processes and degrees of market globalization. Recall that F X xjs X ; = F (x) 2 , and F X xjs X ; = F (x).
Proof of lemma 1: Consider (1) in the text. It follows from (3) that the function f 1 satis…es @f 1 =@ ^ ; @f 1 =@ > 0, and from (2) that ^ = f 2 ( ) is an increasing function of . Hence, we can apply Theorem 3 in Milgrom and Roberts (1994) . The set of …xed points of f : L R + ! L is non-empty and equals the set of equilibria, and = y F B ia y ia is increasing in . Moreover, in case this set is not a singleton, both the highest and the lowest …xed point are increasing in . It is straightforward to check that for ia , y ia = 0. Proof of Proposition 2: The equilibrium belief functions follow immediately from the equilibrium message strategies. That the decision strategy is a double-threshold strategy follows from the analysis preceding the statement of the proposition. Finally, note that for t S = 0, the RHS of (4) 
. One Equating (17) and (18) shows that agent 1 is indi¤erent between sending m r+1 and m r for y = a r if (9) holds.
If X 1;1 = X 2;1 = Y , it is straightforward to check that, if agent 2 uses the collusion strategy, if the center's decision strategy is as stated, and for given beliefs^ , then for agent 1 a collusion strategy with y lo S satisfying (10) is a best-reply. It is straightforward to establish that the belief function follows from applying Bayes'rule to the communication strategies of the agents, and that the center's decision strategy is a best reply given the belief function. . The RHS of both (9) and (10) ia . In case of cl, two agents reveal information truthfully to the center. By continuity of W ia ( ; ) and W cl ( ; ) in , W ia ( ; ) < W cl ( ; ) for all < 4 , for some 4 > 0. The second part of the proposition follows from the facts that (i) Proof of Proposition 8: Consider cl, and suppose N = 3. We know E [Zj0 = a 0 z a 2 ] a 1 = E [Zja 1 z a 3 = 1] a 2 from (9). If two becomes the maximum number of ranks, then a 1 = 0, and so this equality becomes E [Zj0 z a 2 ] = E [Z] a 2 . For any f X , let a 2 < E [Z] denote the unique value of a 2 satisfying this equality. Let a 2=3 := (0; 0; a 2 ; 1).
Hence, (9) and (10) Proof of Proposition 9: Fix , ; and f X . Suppose X 1;1 = X 2;1 . A straightforward comparison of (6) and (12) shows that welfare is the same under dl and cl for all f X , , and
. Now suppose X 1;1 6 = X 2;1 . In case of cl and in equilibrium, the more ranks the agents use, the higher is W . Hence, it su¢ ces to show that the proposition is true if communication under cl is limited to two ranks. Proposition 4 (iv) shows that an equilibrium with two ranks exists for all parameter values. This partition is characterized by a 1 2 (0; E [Z]). Thus, if agents rank their technologies di¤erently, the center picks the higher ranked technology.
Given the communication strategies of the agents this technology is indeed the better one. (7)), whereas a 1 satis…es 1+ 4F (a 1 ) (1 F (a 1 )) = E [Z] a 1 (see (14)). As 4F (a 1 ) (1 F (a 1 )) < 1 for all a 1 , for given parameter values, the reputational gap in case of cl is smaller than in case of dl. As this gap equals the size of the distortion,
cl yields a higher expected welfare than dl.
